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THE LIMITATIONS OF THE ACTION OF AS-
SUMPSIT AS AFFECTING THE RIGHT OF
ACTION OF THE BENEFICIARY.
(Continued from Volume 52, page 779.)
[Errata in first part of article: Page 773, line 15, after the word
A and before the word assigns read "A makes B his executor and dies,
and B having assets."
Note 39, at bottom of page 778, read folio 8, placitum 18.]
In the December number of the AMERICAN LAW REGIS-
TER the writer has presented a number of cases of debt and
of account, in which a beneficiary not a party to the trans-
action was allowed to recover upon the obligation. In
the present issue the writer proposes to conclude the dis-
cussion of the cases of debt, and also to discuss the cases of
account, in respect to the right of action of the beneficiary.
In debt, if the quid pro quo was a chattel, the title to or
the ownership of it was by the delivery absolutely vested in
the debtor.
Where A loaned money to B and then brought debt for
its recovery, the legal title to the money bailed was always
in B, otherwise the very intention of the loan would be
defeated-i.e., if B could not transfer title to the money
he could have no benefit from the loan.' Where A promised
" The subject of a loan may be either a specific thing, as a horse
or a given quantity of a thing which consists in number, weight, or
measure, as money, sugar, or wine. In the former case it is of the
essence of the transaction that the thing lent continue to belong to the
lender: otherwise the transaction is not a loan.
"In the latter case, the thing lent may (and commonly dots) cease
to belong to the lender and become the property of the borrower, such
a loan commonly being an absolute transfer of title in the thing lent
from the lender to the borrower. The reason why such a transfer of
title takes place is obvious. The object of borrowing is to have the
use of the thing borrowed; but the use of things which consist in
number, weight, or measure commonly consumes them; and this use,
of course, the borrower cannot have unless he owns the things used.
When such things are lent, therefore, it is presumed to be the intention
of both parties, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the
borrower shall acquire the title to them.
But why then call the transaction a loan? The answer is, that, in
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B "that if he is willing to carry 20 quarts of wine of my
Master Prisot to G, he shall have 40 shillings," 2 no one in
the time of Henry VI or to-day would contend that the title
to any specific 40 shillings was ever in B. The situation is
not different where A gives B 40 shillings to give to C. B
is C's debtor, but C does not have the title to any specific 4o
shillings. Of course, A can say to B, give C this bag of
coins or these particular crowns, and then no title passes to
B, for the title, so far as B is concerned, is always either in
A or C, according to the nature of the transaction between
them. B is then not a debtor but a bailee, and is bailee to
C in an action of detinue.
Thus in 1339 detinue was brought for 20 pounds " in a
bag sealed up, etc., etc." The defendant objected to the writ
on the ground "that he demands money, which naturally
sounds in an action of debt or account." The plaintiff re-
plied, "We did not count of a loan which sounds in debt,
every particular except the transfer of title, it is a loan; that the
title is transferred for the purpose of making the loan effective as such,
and because it is immaterial to the lender whether he receives back the
identical thing lent or something else just like it. Moreover, the
difference between a loan of money, for example, and a loan of a
specific article, is not commonly present to the minds of the parties;
the lender of money thinks the money lent still belongs to him, and
that the borrower has acquired only the right to use it temporarily;
he is aware that the borrower is entitled to transfer to other persons
the identical coins lent, and that he has the option of returning to him,
the lender, either the identical coins borrowed or others like them;
but he is -not aware that these rights in the borrower are inconsistent
with his retaining the title to the money lent. In other words, he
supposes (and, in every view except the strict legal view, he is right
in supposing) that he may own a given sum of money without owning
any specified coins; and that the only substantial difference between
money in his own coffer and money due to him is, that in the former
case he has -the possession, while in the latter he has not.
A debt, therefore, according to the popular conception of the term,
is a sum of money belonging to one person (the creditor), but in the
possession of another (the debtor). There is also much reason to
believe that this popular conception of a debt was adopted by the early
English law, at least for certain purposes. Thus, the action of debt
(which was established for the sole and exclusive purpose of recovering
debts of every description) was in the nature of an action in rein, and
did not differ in substance from the action of detinue; the chief differ-
ences between them being that the latter was for the recovery of
specified things belonging to the plaintiff, the former, of things not
specified." Langdell's Summary of Contracts, Sections 99, ioo.
2 Year Book, 37 Hen. VI, pl. page 8; see ante, pages 775, 776.
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nor of a receipt of money for profit, which would give an
action of account, but of money delivered in keeping under
seal, etc., which could not be changed." The defendant was
required to answer over. 3
But where money in an unsealed bag was delivered, "one
penny cannot be known from another in a bag, we are of
opinion that detinue does not lie and therefore reverse the
judgment." 4
"When the defendant receives money belonging to the
plaintiff but receives it under such circumstances that he has
a right to *appropriate it to his own use, making himself a
debtor to the plaintiff to the same amount, and the defend-
ant-exercises such right, the receipt of the money will create
a debt." r
In the action of debt, the relation of the debtor to both
the beneficiary and the quid pro quo is plainly distinguish-
able from the relation of the modern trustee to the cestui que
trust, and to the "trust property." This distinction is de-
manded, because the tests which determine a modern trust
are not those which determine a mediaval debt
The practical consequence of confounding debts with
trusts is to erroneously limit the right of action of the bene-
ficiary at common law to only those cases which fulfil the
requisites of a modem trust.
The modem trust, with its conception of a double title
to the trust property,--i.e., of a distinct "equitable owner-
ship" apart from the legal title,-was a conception which
developed in the Court of Chancery many years after the
right of the beneficiary in debt had been established at law.
The cestui que trust in later times recovers, because as to cer-
tain specific property he has a title recognized by Chancery.
The two conceptions of liability are radically distinct. The
'Year Book, 12 and 13 Edw. III, 244; Ames, Cases on Trusts, vol.
i, page 52.
* Banks v. Whetston, i Dyer, 22 b, note 137: "The chattel might be
delivered to the bailee to be delivered to a third person, in which case
the third person was allowed to maintain detinue against the bailee."
Ames: "Parol Contracts Prior to Assumpsit," vi Harvard Law Re-
view, at page 258.
'Langdell: "A Brief Survey of Equity Jurisdiction," ii Harvard
Law Review at page 245 (1889).
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quid pro quo, if a chattel, becomes, as above stated, the abso-
lute property of the debtor. His receipt of it gives rise to
an obligation to pay the beneficiary; but no one ever sup-
poses that the beneficiary's right to recover is based on any
"equitable ownership" of the chattel, or of the sum of
money recovered.
The right of action of the beneficiary in account must next
be considered. Historically, this remedy of the beneficiary
antedates his action of debt, doubtless because in account
there was never required to be a "contract" between the
plaintiff and the defendant.
"A receiver is one who receives money belonging to an-
other for the sole purpose of keeping it safely and paying it
over to its owner." 8
In account, "here again the writ was modelled upon the
proprietary writs. The defendant must 'justly and without
delay render to the plaintiff' something, namely, an account
for the time during which he was the plaintiff's bailiff and
receiver of the plaintiff's money. Even in the modem theory
of our law 'the obligation to render an account is not founded
upon contract, but is created by law independently of con-
tract.' The earliest instance of this action known to us dates
from 1232; the writ seems to come upon the register late in
Henry III's reign, and much of its efficacy in later times was
due to the statutes of 1267 and 1285. These statutes sanc-
tioned a procedure against accountants which was in that
age a procedure of exceptional rigor. We gather that the
accountants in question were for the most part 'bailiffs' in
the somewhat narrow sense that this word commonly bore,
manorial bailiffs. In Edward I's day the action was being
used in a few other cases; it had been given by statute
against the guardian in socage and we find it can be used
among traders who have joined in a commercial adventure;
the trade of the Italian bankers was being carried on by large
'societies' and Englishmen were beginning to learn a little
about partnership. Throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth
'Langdell: "A Brief Survey of Equity Jurisdiction," ii Harvard
Law Review, page 244 (1889).
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centuries the action was frequent enough, as the Year Books
and Abridgements show." 7
It was never necessary, in order to constitute a man your
receiver and therefore to render him accountable to you,
that he should have received the money from you.
"If money be delivered by A to B in order that it may be
delivered by B to C, or if it be delivered by A to B to the use
of C, it has often been held that B will be accountable to C." 8
It was firmly settled that it was not necessary for the re-
ceiver to have actually received the money from the plain-
tiff. If, in the course of his dealing with another person,
the defendant became the receiver of money due the plain-
tiff, though the plaintiff was not privy to the obligation or
even aware of it, he could enforce it.
In a case of account by a legatee against executors the
objection was made: "How can the daughter who never
bails the money to the executors have account?" To which
Lord Brooke answered: "I command you to receive my
rents and deliver them to Lord Dyer, he shall have account
against you: yet he did not bail the money." 9
"If a man deliver money to you to pay to me, I shall have
account against you, although he may be but a messenger.10
"A man shall have a writ of account against one as bailiff
or receiver where he was not his bailiff or receiver; for if a
man receive money for my use, I shall have an account
against him as receiver; or if a man do deliver money unto
another to deliver over unto me, I shall have an account
against him as my receiver." 1"
No one could be your receiver unless he had received
money. The receipt of chattels when the obligation* was to
sell them and convert them into money constituted the de-
fendant not a receiver, but a bailee, who was also liable in
account.'
2
'Pollock and Maitland's History of English Law, vol. ii, page 219
(189s).
'Langdell's "A Brief Survey of Equity Jurisdiction," ii Harvard
Law Review, page 249.
'Paschall v. Keterich, Dyer, 152, note.
10 1 Roll. Abr. Accompt (A), pl. 6.
'F. N. B. 116 Q.
"Langdell: "A Brief Survey of Equity Jurisdiction," ii Harvard
Law Review, page 244 (1889). See 46 E 3f3, pl. 6.
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A distinction was made as early as 1367 between debt
and account, when Cavendish said: "If I deliver certain
money to you to deliver to John, he shall have a writ of ac-
count because the property is in him straightway upon your
receipt by my hand; and he cannot have an action of
debt." 13
In 18 Edward IV (1479) the dicta of two judges
illustrate the controversy which was so long waged as to
whether debt or account would lie in favor of a third person.
Catesby, I.: "If I deliver 2o pounds to Catesby to deliver
to Piggott, he can choose to have a writ of account against
Catesby, or writ of debt." But Brian, I., thought otherwise:
"and to this that is said that I shall have an action of debt
or account, I say that he shall have an action of account
and not action of debt, for upon what thing shall his action
of debt be founded? Upon a contract, not upon purchases,
nor upon borrowing he cannot declare." 14
"If a man deliver money to you to pay to me," said the
court in 6 Henry IV, "I shall have a writ of account against
you and not a writ of debt because there is no contract
between you.' 5  "The obligation to render an account
is not founded upon contract, but is created by law inde-
pendently of contract." 16
In the earlier cases the argument is constantly advanced
that the beneficiary's only remedy is account, but this con-
tention is always met by the counter argument that he can
sue either in account or debt. Thus in 1405 this colloquy
occurs:
Hank.-" For if a man delivers certain monies to you to
pay to me, I shall have a writ of account against you and not
writ of debt, because there is no contract between you."
Tillesley.-" I think I can elect to have a writ of account
or writ of debt."
Thirning.-" If a man takes rent from your tenants, shall
you have a writ of debt?"
"Year Book, 41 Edward III, folio io, P1. 5. See ante, page 770.
"Year Book, 18 Edward IV, folio 23, pl. 5.
"Year Book, 6 Hen. IV, folio 7, pl. 33. See ante, page 771.
"cA Brief Survey of Equity jurisdiction," by C. C. Langdell, in
ii Harvard Law Review, at page 243 (0889).
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.Tillesley.-" No, not there, but I shall have a writ of tres-
pass. I suppose that if he takes it by your authority, you
shall not have a writ of debt, but a writ of account, because
there is no contract between you." 17
But by 1624 debt was allowed where money was given
to the defendant to pay to the plaintiff. The old contention
as to there being no "contract" between plaintiff and de-
fendant created by the plaintiff's delivery of the money was
ignored, and from this date it was acknowledged law "that
cesty que use the delivery is made may have debt or ac-
count." 18
This distinction between the cases where the beneficiary
could bring account and where he could bring debt does not
turn upon the question whether the defendant has acquired,
and, therefore, can legally transfer, the title to the thing or
money given him. The distinction turns on the question
whether the defendant's receipt of a chattel or money con-
stitutes a quid pro quo, i.e., whether he may employ the
chattels or money for the profit of himself (as his own
property), or must employ it for the profit of another. The
first alternative demanded an action of debt; the second, an
action of account. As, in either alternative, we have seen
that the beneficiary was given a remedy, the distinction loses
its interest and importance. As shown by the last cited case,
after 1624 the remedy of debt or account would lie even if
the money was received only to pay a like sum to a third
person.
Besides the distinction already made that the origin of
debt was in contract while the origin of account was inde-
pendent of contract, these actions must be compared and con-
trasted in other particulars.
Account, like debt, was clearly distinguishable from
detinue. It was only in its most primitive form that account
was conceived as droitural. The idea was that the defendant
had possession of something belonging to the plaintiff, viz.,
' Year Book, 6 Hen. IV, folio 7, pl. 33.
"Harris v. De Bervoir, Croke, James, 687. See ante, page 773.
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an account.1 9 In account, possession was a fiction just as in
debt.2 0 The plaintiff who sought to make a defendant in ac-
count his receiver was never regarded as having the title to
any particular money. "If the property received consist of
money, the defendant must not be bound to restore to the
plaintiff the identical coin received by him; for, if he is, he
will be a mere bailee-e.g., if the money be sealed up in a
bag. So he must not, as has been seen, have a right to ap-
propriate the money received to his own use, for then he
can be only a debtor. He must receive the money either to
keep for the plaintiff, or to employ for the plaintiff's benefit;
and yet his obligation must be capable of being discharged
by returning to the plaintiff (not the identical money re-
ceived, but) any money equal in amount to the sum received.
For money cannot possibly 'be employed so as to yield a
profit or income without losing its identity; and though it
may be so kept as to preserve its identity, yet the duty of so
keeping it will, as has been seen, make the keeper a mere
bailee. Moreover, such a mode of keeping money is very
unusual, and such a mode of keeping another person's
money would presumptively be very improper, for the rec-
ognized mode of keeping money is to deposit it with a
banker; and yet by so depositing it its identity is lost, for
the moment it is deposited it becomes the property of the
banker, the latter becoming indebted to the depositor in the
same amount." 21
"It will be seen, therefore, that in respect to the question
under consideration, money differs from land or goods in at
least three particulars: first, a receiver of money frequently
becomes a debtor instead of a bailee, though the object for
which he is made receiver is safe custody merely, as in the
case of a banker; secondly, a receiver of money, not being a
banker, may be, and commonly is, accountable for the money
received, though he receive it for safe custody merely, be-
cause, though not a debtor, yet he is not bound to preserve
the identity of the money received; thirdly, a receiver of
' Pollock and Maitland's History of English Law, vol. ii, page 219.
'See ante, page 775.
' Langdell, in ii Harvard Law Review, page 246.
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money, if accountable at all, is always accountable for the
corpus, since it is impossible that a receiver of money should
be bound to return the identical money received, and yet be
bound to account for profits made by employing the
money." 22
The distinction, then, between account and debt was not
in respect to the title of the money recovered, for neither
action was droitural; but the distinction was that in account
the defendant had money which he was obliged to keep or
employ for the plaintiff. A "receipt of money for profit," 23
ad merchandisandum,24 was often the gist of account. In
debt there was no duty to do anything but merely to pay
over the sum for which the defendant had become, in what-
ever way, obligated; "but if I bring an action of account
I shall recover the increase and the profit of the same
lent,"-i.e., if the bailment was ad merchandisandum.25
It has been said by Ames that "A plaintiff entitled to an
account was strictly a cestui que trust;" 26 and further,
that "trusts for the payment of money were enforced at
common law long before Chancery gave effect to trusts of
land. It need not surprise us, therefore, to find that upon
the delivery of money by A to B to the use of C, or to be
delivered to C, C might maintain an action of account
against B." 27
This language is an apt simile, but does not represent,
and was doubtless not intended to represent, an exact equa-
tion.
Misapprehension will arise if the position of the bene-
= Langdell: ii Harvard Law Review, at page 247.
See Dyer, 125, ante, page, 771, note 21.
=' See Harris v. Bervoir, Cro. Jac. 687, ante, page 772.
See Dyer, 125, ante, page 771; but see Rolle Accompt, 0. 125, 12, 14.
'Ames: Parol Contracts Prior to Assumpsit; viii Harvard Law
Review, 258 (1894).
= Parol contracts prior to assumpsit, viii Harvard Law Review, 258
(1894), citing the following authorities: Fitz. Abr. Acct. io8 (32 Ed.
III) ; Bellevue Acct. 7 (2 Rich. II) ; Y. B., 41 Ed. III, io-5; 6 Hen.
IV, 7-33; 1 Hen. V, 11--21; 36 Hen. VI, 9, io-5; 18 Ed. IV, 23, 5;
i Ed. V, 2, 2; Robsert v. Andrews, Cro. Eliz. 82; Huntley v. Griffith,
Gold, i5g; Harrington v. Rothervam, Hob. 36; Brownl. 26 S. C.;
Clark's Case, Godb. 210, pl. 299; Ames's Cases in Trusts (2 ed.), i,
note 3; 4, note I.
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ficiary in account is understood as identical with that of the
modem cestui que trust in equity.
If A transfers chattels or stock to B, directing B to apply
the rent or income of the property to the payment of A's
creditor, X, there arises, by the doctrine of trusts, a double
title, one equitable in X, and the other legal in B, and the
situation is called in equity, a trust.
If A gives chattels to B in such a way that the chattels are
the absolute property of B, and in consideration thereof B
promises to pay A's creditor, X, there is no trust whatever.
While it is true that the action of account is based on the
conception that something-viz., an account-belonging to
one man, the plaintiff, is in the possession of another man,
the defendant, we have above shown that no specific money
is supposed to be owned by the plaintiff. His right is only to
receive an equivalent sum. In account, the defendant's "ob-
ligation must be capable of being discharged by returning to
the plaintiff (not the identical money received, but) any
money equal in amount to the sum received." 28 In the
former of the two above stated cases, X has by the modem
doctrine of trusts an equitable title with respect to the
chattels. In the latter case, he has no equitable title, but
he has the right to recover in the common law action of
account.29
The right of action of the beneficiary at common law in
account was therefore different from that of a cestui que
trust, because the former had a right of action notwithstand-
ing the fact that the title to the property might be vested ab-
solutely and solely in the defendant. ,
This distinction between a trust and an accountability to,
or receivership in favor of, a third party is of much conse-
quence because the second of the two above hypothetical
cases (i.e., where no modem trust exists) is a typical form-
ula expressing the right of a third party to recover at com-
mon law in account.
Langdell: ii Harvard Law Review, page 246.
' See ante, pages 770 to 774.
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The cases cited by Ames have all been examined without
disclosing anything inconsistent with this conclusion.
The first reported cases in Chancery- where the heir or
transferee of the title of cestui que use compels "the feofee
to uses" to convey 30 are of the reign of Edward IV, 31 and
are readily explained on the ground of a duty imposed by
Chancery on the conscience of the feofee to uses without
resorting to any conception of "equitable ownership."
We find the right of the beneficiary in account recognized
as early as 1368,32 where the transaction is descried as a
bailment and not yet as a transfer of property " al oeps."
The first case the writer has found where the words " al
oeps" are used in this connection was in 1458.
If we look to the then contemporaneous chancery doctrine
of uses, we find nothing to indicate that a use in Chancery
in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries was more than a
personal right of cestui que use, his heirs, devisee, or as-
signee, against the feofee to uses.
The authorities collected by Ames establish beyond ques-
tion that as late as 1450 the heir of the feofee to uses held
the land free from liability to the cestui que use.33
A use might be enforced by the heir, etc., "but neither a
wife, a husband, nor a judgment creditor was entitled to this
privilege." 34 "If the feofee to uses died without heir or
committed a forfeiture or married, neither the lord who en-
tered for the escheat or forfeiture nor the husband who
retained the possession as tenant by the curtesy, nor the wife
to whom the dower was assigned, were liable to perform the
trust, because they were not parties to the transaction, but
came in by act of law, or in the post, and not in the per, as
it was said, though doubtless their title in reason was no
better than that of the heir against whom the remedy was
extended. It was the same as regards any other person who
"Archbishop of York v. Richard Osborn and Edward Gower, Cal.
94; Spence's Equitable Jurisdiction, page 454.
"Chancery Calendars.
"Year Book 41 Edward III, folio io, placitum 5. See ante, page 771.
'Ames's Cases on Trusts, vol. i, page 345, notes i and 2.
" Spence's Equitable Jurisdiction, page 446.
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obtained possession, not claiming by any contract or agree-
ment with the feofee, between whom and the cestui que use,
therefore, there was no privity. 'Where there was no trust,
there could be no breach of trust.' The remedy against a
disseisor, therefore, was not in Chancery at the instance of
the cestui que trust, but at law at the instance of the feofee;
and it was part of his duty to pursue his legal remedies at
the desire of the cestui que trust." 35
Uses of personality were doubtless enforced in Chancery
at an early date,36 but in debt and account there is not the
slightest ground for believing that the recovery of a bene-
ficiary was based on any ownership, equitable or otherwise,
of any specific coins or chattels, or that the defendant in
account could ever be restricted from transferring the title to
both the money and the property "received." It has been
previously shown that the same is true of the title to the quid
pro quo in debt. The modem characteristic of equitable
ownership-the right to compel the trustee to devote the res
to the designated purposes-was precisely what courts of
law in account never dreamed of attempting. If complete
title had not been transferred to the receiver, the very pur-
pose of the receipt ad merchandisandum would have been
frustrated. A court of law was obviously without the ma-
chinery to enforce such an equitable title had it existed.
It is, of course, true that judges and counsel, in speaking
of the plaintiff's right of recovery in account, refer to his
"property" in the money sought to be recovered.3 7
But this means no more than the similar popular concep-
tion that we have seen existed in regard to debt and which
survives to-day in the popular expression "money in the
bank." 38
Spence's Equitable Jurisdiction, page 445, citing Year Book ixi Hen.
VIII, 24: "The King or lord by escheat cannot be seised to an use or
trust for they are in the post and are paramount to the confidence."
Jenk. Ca. xcii.
See Spence, page 456, note h (temp. Hen. VI).
See ante, pages 770-771. Cases in Year Books.
" The repayment of an equivalent sum of money is equated, with
the bold crudity of archaic legal thought, to the restitution of specific
land or goods. Our Germanic ancestors could not conceive credit under
any other form. After all, one may doubt whether the majority of
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It is true that the cases in account speak of the defendant's
having received the money "al oeps" of the plaintiff.39
But in reading cases of debt and account in the fifteenth,
sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries we must not mistranslate
"oeps"-use, still less should we translate "oeps"-trust.
The word "oeps" is derived from the Latin opus, signifying
benefit, and not from the word uses,40 a term of definite legal
meaning in the civil law.
41
Thanks to Maitland's researches, we have direct evidence
that for many years "oeps" was used merely to signify a
benefit and without any settled technical signification,
either of a later Chancery trust or of a civil law "usus."
His researches show that in 1238-9 Bracton records that
"a woman, mother of H, desires a house belonging to R; H
procures from R a grant of the house to H to the use (ad
opus) of his mother for her life." 42
As late as the year 1339 occurs a case, not mentioned by
Maitland, where the word " oeps" is used unmistakably in
the sense of benefit and without any suggestion of a legal
and equitable title. In Year Book XII and XIII Edward
III, page 231 (I339), occurs the description of a feudal
fairly well-to-do people, even at this day, realize that what a man calls
' my money in the bank' is a mere personal obligation of the banker to
him." "Pollock's Contracts in Early English Law," vi Harvard Law
Review, page 399 (1892).
' See ante, pages 771 et seq. Cases in Year Books. See also Year
Book 2 Hen. IV, pl. 5o, folio 12.
" " The Origin of Uses," by F. W. Maitland, viii Harvard Law
Review, page 127 (1894) ; Pollock and Maitland's History of English
Law, vol. ii, pages 228-240.
' " The germ of agency is hardly to be distinguished from the germ
of another institution which in our English law has an eventful future
before it, the 'use trust or confidence.' In tracing its embryonic history
we must first notice the now established truth that the English word use
when it is employed with a technical meaning in legal documents is de-
rived, not from the Latin word usus, but from the Latin word opus,
which in Old French becomes os of oes. True that the two words are
in course of time confused, so that, if by a Latin document land is to be
conveyed to the use of John, the Scribe of the Charter will write ad
opus lohannis, or ad usum Johannis indifferently, or will perhaps adopt
the fuller formula, ad opus et ad usum, nevertheless the earliest history
of 'the use' is the early history of the phrase ad opus."-Maitland:
"The Origin of Uses," viii Harvard Law Review, page 127.
'"F. W. Maitland: " The Origin of Uses," viii Harvard Law Review,
page 134.
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conveyance, and in describing the transaction the language
applied to the vendors is:
"Il vendront et rendront en la court le seignur al oeps
celui qe serra feffe et les baillifs front execution."
The note of the editor of this translation of the Year
Books shows that the words "ad oeps," which he has trans-
lated "to the use," are in the record "ad opus."
"We hardly need say that the use of our English law is
not derived from the Roman 'personal servitude;' the two
have no feature in common. Nor can I believe that the
Roman ldeicommissum has anything to do with the evolu-
tion of the English use. In the first place, the English use
in its earliest stage is seldom, if ever, the outcome of a last
will, while the fideicommissum belongs essentially to the
law of testaments. In the second place, if the English use
were a Iideicomnnissum it would be called so, and we should
not see it gradually emerging out of such phrases as ad
opus and ad usum. What we see is a vague idea, which
developing in one direction becomes what we now know as
agency, and developing in another direction becomes that
use which the common law will not, but equity will, protect.
Of course, again, our 'equitable ownership' when it has
reached its full stature has enough in common with the
przetorian bonorum possessio to make a comparison between
the two instructive; but an attempt to derive the one from
the other would be too wild for discussion." 4
3
The present discussion does not involve such recondite
issues as whether or not, and if so, to what extent, Chancery
was indebted to the civil law for the doctrine of uses.
The cases taken from the Year Books show that the word
"oeps" is frequently used in describing the beneficiary.
The writer submits that there is not the slightest reason to
believe that either in the Year Books or in Rolle the word
"oeps" or "use," etc., was used in the technical meaning of
a modem trust--i.e., to convey the idea of equitable owner-
ship and a douLle title. What is here contended is that in
the cases of debt and account in the Year Books the word
"oeps" or "opus" is used in the then familiar and common
"F. W. Maitland: "The Origin of Uses," viii Harvard Law Review,
page 137.
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everyday meaning of benefit.44 In debt or account it was
enough if the chattel or money was received for the benefit
of a third person. The beneficiary recovered in debt or in
account, not because he was a "fructuarius" under the civil
law, nor because he was a "cestui qua trust," that later
prot~g6 of Chancery, but because the primary obligation
known as a debt or a receivership had been created for the
plaintiff's benefit by the defendant's receipt of money or
property.
As account was not based on contract, the obligation of
the defendant to account to the beneficiary presupposed no
prior contractual relation of any kind between them. The
phrase "stranger to the consideration," as applied to the
plaintiff in account, would have been meaningless jargon to
the lawyers of the fifteenth century. After four centuries
the phrase has become no more applicable.
Nor was the plaintiff in account required to be the prom-
isee. Privity to the defendant's obligation was a pure fic-
tion. "If, however, he obtain possession in the plaintiff's
behalf and as his representative, though without any actual
authority, the plaintiff may adopt and ratify his acts, and
thus establish privity between him and the plaintiff.45
"Year Book io Hen. VI, 6, pl. ig: "A man brought writ of debt
against an executor and recovered and had fieri facias to the sheriff of
London, and levied the money of the goods of the deceased. And the
sheriff returned that he had no goods of the deceased, but that they
had goods long time before the writ and he delivered and had sold the
goods and converted the sum to their own oeps."
Year Book io Hen. VI, Ii, 38: "Bakington. The husband shall
have good action in this case that you have put and it is not against
reason that the husband shall be charged of this debt, for the freehold
was in him as well as in the wife during the coverture, and all profits
of the land he took to his own oeps.
Year Book 4 Ed. I1, so, pl. 45: "One A brought his writ of account
against G, de tempore quo fuit receptor denarr, and counted that he
received 20 pounds to trade, etc., and of this good and legal account
rendered, and said if he would deny it he had good suit, and see here
the deed which witnesses it; and it was read and said that G had
received 2o pounds of the aforesaid A and P, his wife to profit to the
oeps of the aforesaid A and P, and bound themselves to pay 20 pounds
on a certain day to the aforesaid A and P."
Year Book 4 Ed. III, 31, pl. 38 (last of case): "Thorpe. Say
whether she administered as executrix, or not, as this writ charges;
for peradventure if she claims all to her own oeps, and does not make
distribution for alms, then she did not administer as executrix."
"Langdell's "Brief Survey of Equity Jurisdiction," ii Harvard Law
Review, pages 248, 249.
LIMITATIONS OF THE ACTION OF ASSUMPSIT. 127
Debt and accountability were therefore primary common
law obligations enforceable by the beneficiary, not because
he was a "privy" to the contract, or a "promisee" or a
"cestui que trwst," or had furnished that "mystery" of the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries--" the consideration."
We err in attempting to analyze into constituent elements
a substantive right which is itself primary and elemental.
The beneficiary recovered because the judicial instinct
recognized that he ought to recover, and the courts held
that by common law he had a substantive right. This
common law right was the expression of a public sense of
justice, and a firmer foundation for a positive rule of law
need not be sought.
"Justinian's Pandects only make precise
What simply sparkled in men's eyes before,
Twitched in their brow or quivered on their lip,
Waited the speech they called but would not come."
Crawford D. Hening.
(To be continued.)
